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Board of Education of the Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens:
EQUAL ACCESS ACT ALLOWING
A HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT
RELIGIOUS GROUP TO MEET ON
SCHOOL PREMISES DURING
NONINSTRUCTIONAL TIME
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
In Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,
llO S. Ct. 2356 (1990), the Supreme
Court held that the Equal Access Act
("Act") prohibited a public high school
from denying a student religious group
permission to meet on school premises
during noninstructional time. The
Court based its decision on statutory
interpretation of the Act and Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), which
allowed university students to form a
similar religious club.
In 1985, a group of students led by
Bridget Mergens met with Westside
High School's principal and requested
permission to form a Christian Bible
Club at the school. The club was to have
the same privileges and conditions as
other Westside school groups, except
that it would not have a faculty sponsor,
such a sponsor would violate the Establishment Clause. School officials denied
the request, explaining that school
policy required a faculty sponsor for all
student clubs, and a religious club at a
public high school would in itself violate
the Establishment Clause. The school
board upheld the denial.
A suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief was brought by Westside students in the United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska. The students argued that the denial violated the
Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.c. §§ 40714074 (1984). The Act prohibits public
secondary schools, which receive federal assistance and maintain a "limited
open forum" from denying "equal access" to students who wish to meet
within the forum on the basis of the
content of the speech at such meetings.
Westside, llO S. Ct. at 2364 (citing 20
U.S.c. § 4071(a)).
The trial court determined that the Act
did not apply in that all of the school's
student clubs were curriculum-related
and tied to the educational function of
theschool.ld. at 2363. Therefore, Westside did not have a "limited open forum"
as defined by the Act. Id.
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The United States Court ofAppeals for
the Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court's judgment. Id. The Court noted
that many of Westside's student clubs
were non-curriculum related and thus,
the school maintained a "limited open
forum." The court of appeals held that
the Act applied and prohibited discrimination against the students' proposed
club on the basis of religiOUS content:ld.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, holding that the school board
violated the Equal Access Act in denying
the students' religious club official
recognition.ld. The Court also held that
the Act, and its application to Westside,
did not violate the Establishment Clause
of the first amendment. Id. at 2373. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court's
analysis was splintered. Three opinions
and eight Justices agreed that the Act
was not an unconstitutional establishment of religion.
The plurality opinion, delivered by
Justice O'Connor, was an extension of
the holding in Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981). In Widmar, the Court
held that public universities must offer
student religious groups the same privileges and conditions afforded other student organizations. The ruling, however,
suggested that a different analysis might
be needed for younger, more impressionable students below the college
level. The Westside Court concluded
that the analysis should apply to secondary students. Westside, 110 S. Ct. at
2371.
The Court began its analysis by interpreting the language of the Act which
states that whenever a public secondary
school allows" one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on
school premises during noninstructional
time," a "limited open forum" exists. Id.
at 2364 (quoting 20 U.S.c. § 4071(b)).
Although the Act did not explicitly
define the phrase "noncurriculum related student group," the Court concluded that such a group included any
student group not directly related to the
body of courses offered by the school.
Id. at 2366.
The Court then determined that Westside permitted noncumculum-related
student groups to meet after school on
school premises. The Court noted that
other groups, including a scuba diving
club and a chess club, were not directly
related to official school courses. There-

fore, because Westside permitted" one
or more noncurriculum student groups
to meet on school premises during noninstructional time," the Court concluded
that Westside maintained a "limited
open forum." Id. at 2370. Thus, Westside could not discriminate based on the
content of the student's speech, and its
refusal to grant recognition to the religious group constituted a denial of
equal access to the school's limited
open forum in violation of the Act. Id.
The second step of the Court's analysis focused on whether the Equal Access
Act, on its face and as applied to Westside, violated the Establishment Clause
of the first amendment. In making its
determination, the Court applied the
three-prong test set out in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The
Lemon test provided that an equal access
law must have a secular purpose, that its
primary effect may neither advance nor
inhibit religion, and that it may not foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13. The
Court relied on its application of the test
to religious clubs at a state university
level in Widmar, where the Court held
that the" equal access" policy was not a
violation of the Establishment Clause.
Westside, llO S. Ct. at 2370 (citing
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274-75). The Westside Court stated that the logic of Widmar applied with "equal force to the
Equal Access Act." Id. at 2371.
First, the Court determined that the
secular purpose prong of the test was
satisfied in that the Act on its face grants
equal access to both secular and religious speech. Id. The Court then determined that because the Act did not have
the primary effect of advancing religion,
the second prong of the test was also
satisfied. The Court proposed that a
"crucial difference" existed between
government and private speech endorsing religion. Id. at 2732. The Court
stated that "secondary school students
are mature enough and are likely to
understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it
merely permits on a nondiscriminatory
basis." Id. Furthermore, the Act avoided
the problem of student emulation of
teachers as role models and mandatory
attendance requirements, which might
indicate official endorsement, by expressly limiting the participation of
school officials at student religious club

meetings. The Court recognized that
the possibility of student peer pressure
would still remain, however, this pressure presented little risk of official endorsement or coercion because no formal classroom activities were involved
and school officials could not actively
participate. [d.
Finally, applying the Lemon entanglement prong, the Court concluded that
the school did not risk excessive entanglement by complying with the Act. The
Act prohibited faculty monitors from
participating in the meetings, as well as
non-school persons from directing or
regularly attending the student religious
meetings. Moreover, school "sponsorship" of religious meetings was prohibited. [d. The Court again relied on
Widmar, stating that a denial of equal
access might create greater entanglement problems through invasive monitoring to prevent religious speech at
such meetings. [d. Accordingly, the
Court held that the Equal Access Act did
not violate the Establishment Clause. [d.
Two concurring opinions expressed a
different establishment premise. Justice
Kennedy concluded that the incidental
benefits realized by allowing official
recognition of a student religiOUS club
did not lead to an establishment of religion. He stated that nothing on the face
of the Act or the Westside facts demonstrated the presence of pressure to
participate in the religious club. [d. at
2376-77 (Kennedy,]., concurring). Justice Marshall offered a more cautious
opinion, stating that the school must
"fully disassociate" itself from the club's
religious speech, activities, and goals. In
his view, the school must also avoid the
appearance of sponsoring or endorsing
the club's goals. [d. at 2378 (Marshall,].,
concurring).
The Supreme Court's holding in Westside will have an immediate impact on
this country's school systems. Some
school districts have waited for the Westside opinion before deciding whether to
approve similar after-school student
clubs. Now, student religious groups
can demand equal access without fear of
violating the first amendment.
- Scot D. Morrell

Hodgson fJ. Minnesota: STATE
ABORTION LAW REQUIRING
TWO-PARENT NOTIFICATION
PRIOR TO A MINOR'S OBTAINING AN ABORTION IS CONSTITUTIONAL IF A JUDICIAL
BYPASS PROCEDURE IS
PROVIDED

In Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct.
2926 ( 1990), the United States Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a
Minnesota statute requiring that a pregnant minor notify both of her parents
before having an abortion. Although the
Court found the notification requirement itself to be unconstitutional, the
statute as a whole was saved because it
provided the alternative ofbypassing such
notice by obtaining judicial approval.
The Minnesota statute provided that,
with certain exceptions, an abortion
could not be performed on a woman
under 18 years of age until at least 48
hours after both of her parents were
notified. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2930.
This notice was mandatory unless 1) the
attending physician certified the necessity of an immediate abortion to prevent
the woman's death, 2) both of her parents had consented to the abortion in
writing, or 3) the minor declared that
she was a victim of parental abuse or
neglect and notice of her declaration .
was given to the proper authorities. [d.
The statute provided that if the court
enjoined the enforcement of the parental notice requirement, the same requirement would be effective unless the
pregnant woman obtained a court order
permitting the abortion. [d. To acquire
such a court order, the minor had to
convince a judge either that she was
"mature and capable of giving informed
consent" to the abortion or that an abortion without notice to both parents
would be in her best interests. [d. at
2932-33.
Agroup consisting ofpregnant minors,
clinics, doctors, and the mother of a
pregnant minor challenged the statute
by filing suit in district court. The group
alleged that the statute violated the Due
Process and Equal Protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment. [d. at 2934.
The district court found both the twoparent notification requirement and the
48-hour waiting period to be invalid,
and therefore concluded that the statute
was unconstitutional in its entirety and

enjoined its enforcement. [d. The
United States Court of Appeals, sitting
en banc, reversed. The court determined
that the two-parent notification requirement was unconstitutional unless,
as in this case, a judicial bypass procedure was prOvided. [d. at 2935. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed. The Court held that the twoparent notification requirement was
not reasonably related to legitimate state
interests and was therefore unconstitutional, but agreed that the bypass procedure saved the statute as a whole. [d.
at 2947.
The Court began its analysis by recognizing that the due process clause's
constitutional protection against unjustified state intrusion into a woman's
decision whether to bear a child extended to pregnant minors. [d. (citing
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976». Since the Minnesota
statute placed obstacles in the pregnant
minor's path to an abortion, the state
had the burden of establishing its constitutionality; to wit, that the obstacles imposed were reasonably related to legitimate state interests. [d..
In considering the constitutionality of
the notification requirement, the Court
recognized that similar statutes containing parental consent or notification requirements had previously been evaluated by the Court and were determined
to be constitutional. The Court noted,
however, that none of these cases had
considered the significance of requiring
the notification of two parents, rather
than only one. [d. at 2938. Thus, the
Court focused its analysis on this distinction.
In defending the statute, the state
relied primarily on the state's interest in
protecting the independent right of
parents "to determine and strive for
what they believe to be best for their
children," and not on the best interests
of the minor. [d. at 2946. While the
Court recognized that such an interest
may be legitimate, it found that it would
be fully served by a requirement that the
minor notify one parent. [d. at 2945.
The Court determined that in functioning families, where the parents communicate with each other, notice to one
parent would normally constitute notice
to both and the two-parent notification
requirement would therefore be unnec-
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